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I. INTRODUCTION. 
In their February 14, 2019, blog post, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), officially announced 
their decision to withdraw from the HQ2 deal in Long Island City, Queens, New York.1  Amazon 
established the HQ2 initiative as an endeavor to locate the most ideal location for a second 
headquarters.2  Their efforts in publicly informing states about this endeavor, however, had much 
to do with acquiring competitive tax incentive offers by the different cities and states under the 
auspices of catalyzing their respective economies in return.3  In early November, after two years 
of searching, Amazon announced their commitment to headquarter part of their second location in 
the Long Island City Queens location.4  This was due, in part, to the tax incentive arrangement 
established between New York and Amazon.5  To simplify the terms of the HQ2 arrangement with 
New York, Amazon would create over twenty-five thousand new jobs with an average 
compensation of $150,000 over the course of 10 years.6  In return, the Ordinance of New York 
would provide over $1.2 billion in tax credits and $505 million in upfront capital grants over the 
same period of time through the Excelsior Investment Program.7 
Despite the proffered economic boon to be experienced by New York from the HQ2 
proposal, Amazon’s decision to abandon the arrangement with New York after two years of 
searching came after much obstruction, resentment, and trepidation by local forces.8  To many, 
 
1 About Amazon, Update on plans for New York City headquarters (Feb. 14, 2019), AMAZON.COM, 
https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/update-on-plans-for-new-york-city-headquarters. 
2 Joseph Pisani, How Amazon's planned HQ2 in New York became HQ-zero: Incentives, helipad spurred protests, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Feb. 18, 2019, 7:40 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-amazon-hq2-new-
york-behind-the-scenes-20190218-story.html. 
3 Memorandum from the New York State Urban Development Corporation to the Head of WW Economic 
Development (Nov. 12, 2018) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
4 Jill Disis, New York mayor says Amazon headquarters debacle was 'an abuse of corporate power', CNN (Feb. 17, 
2019, 1:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/17/tech/bill-de-blasio-amazon-hq2/index.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Memorandum, supra note 3. 
7 Id.  
8 Disis, supra note 4. 
including Senator Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, Amazon’s decision to drop out of the HQ2 deal was 
a disaster averted.9  To others, including New York Mayor DeBlasio and Governor Cuomo, the 
withdrawal of the HQ2 deal was a devastating political and practical defeat to New Yorkers.10 
Despite the political bruhaha that followed both Amazon’s HQ2 announcement of and 
withdrawal from their decision to headquarter in Queens, there was a dearth of public dialogue 
regarding the constitutionality in offering such state tax incentive measures in the first place.  
Virtually all of the several states offer some type of tax incentive programs that aim to influence 
business locations decisions.  New York’s tax incentive program is the Excelsior Investment 
Program.11  The Excelsior Investment Program is a state-sponsored tax incentive program 
incorporated by New York aimed at “encourag[ing] businesses to expand in and relocate to New 
York.”12  The Amazon HQ2 proposal was the largest Excelsior Investment Program offer 
established since its inception,13 purporting to add billions to New York’s economy.14  Virtually 
every state within the United States incorporates similar tax incentive programs expressly aimed 
at attracting business within the designated state.  Given that the policies are created by states and 
have the potential to impact interstate commerce, there may be Commerce Clause implications.  
Accordingly, this Note will discuss the constitutionality in offering tax incentive programs under 
the Commerce Clause. 
This Note will first introduce the concept of tax incentive programs, including Business 
Location Tax Incentives, and their effect on state economies.  Next, this Note will introduce the 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM, https://esd.ny.gov/excelsior-jobs-program. (last visited Apr. 30, 2019). 
12 Id.  
13 Empire State Dev., EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM, 
https://cdn.esd.ny.gov/businessprograms/data/excelsior/excelsiorjobsprogramoverview.pdf. (last visited Apr. 30, 
2019). 
14 Id.  
constitutional principles that are implicated by such tax incentive programs, particularly the 
Commerce Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause.  This Note will then analyze whether 
Business Location Tax Incentives are constitutional under the applicable tests enunciated in 
Commerce Clause case law.  Finally, if BLTIs, as they currently stand, are found unconstitutional, 
this Note will analyze the possibility of conforming BLTI policies to constitutional requirements. 
II. BACKGROUND. 
 
Tax Incentive Programs and Business Location Tax Incentives. 
 
Tax incentives are tax-policy measures implemented by states to “reduc[e] taxes for 
businesses and individuals” in exchange for the performance of some “desirable economic, 
aesthetic, [or] social” action.15  Essentially, tax incentive measures offer credits against otherwise 
applicable tax obligations to individuals who satisfy certain requirements that are usually catered 
towards public policy initiatives.16  The desirable actions that tax incentive programs aim to 
promote can range from promoting social responsibility to enhancing economic activity of the 
particular locality.17  No two tax incentive programs are alike, and “the methods employed by the 
states offering tax incentives are varied and can differ within and among the taxes levied by other 
states.”18  “Exclusions, abatements, deductions, deferrals, and credits are all common” features 
within tax incentive programs.19 
Beginning in the late 18th and early 19th century, tax incentives were increasingly offered 
in an effort to encourage economic development within the offering state.20  These tax incentive 
 
15 Phil Rabinowitz, Using Tax Incentives to Support Community Health and Development, 
https://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/implement/changing-policies/tax-incentives/main. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. (e.g., tax deductions for charitable contributions). 
18 Philip M. Tatarowicz, Federalism, the Commerce Clause, and Discriminatory State Tax Incentives: A Defense of 
Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to in-State Activities of the Taxpayer, 60 Tax Law. 835, 839 (2007). 
19 Id.  
20 PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER AT MITCHELL HAMLINE SCHOOL OF LAW, STATE UNIFORMITY DOCTRINES 
programs offered tax incentives as a means to attract or retain businesses to the offering State, 
which would subsequently create “more local jobs, more tax revenue (leading to the possibility of 
more funding for schools and services), [and] an injection of energy into the community.”21  For 
purposes of this Note, such tax incentive programs will be referred to as Business Location Tax 
Incentives (“BLTI”).  BLTIs have become a means by which a state “compete[s] with other states 
for limited investment dollars [to] foster its broader economic development goals.”22  
BLTIs are a highly attractive way for municipalities and states to compete in the hunt for 
big-business because “[p]olicymakers can fine-tune [the] incentive[]” agreement to achieve any 
desired tax-related offer sought by interested businesses when creating the legislation.23  The 
ability to customize the parameters behind BLTI programs renders them readily applicable in any 
given incentive arrangement and allows states and localities to foster highly-competitive tax-
reducing instruments.24  Given their use as competitive devices, such tax incentives are usually 
“limited to in-state activities” in order to reap the entire economic benefit.25   
States implement BLTIs by incorporating them within their respective tax legislation or 
tax code.26  The implementation of BLTIs, similar to the implementation of any other tax policy, 
lies well within the states’ authority to tax given the governmental structure of the United States.  
The United States of America is considered a federation of States.27  As a federation, “lawmaking 
 
AND SUGARY DRINK TAXES (Oct. 2017), https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/State-
Uniformity-Sugary-Drink-Taxes-2017.pdf (discussing the shift in the American economy from primarily focusing 
on agriculture to more commercial enterprise). 
21 Id.  
22 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 839. 
23 Rabinowitz, supra note 15. 
24 Id.  
25 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 839 (“Little is gained by the states in their competition for limited resources if they 
are required to offer uniform tax incentives, or a single state is required to provide the same tax benefit for activities 
taking place within and without its borders.”) 
26 See EXCELSIOR JOBS PROGRAM, https://esd.ny.gov/excelsior-jobs-program. (last visited Apr. 30, 2019). 
27 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 12, (10th ed. 2013). 
is decentralized” among the numerous states, at least when federal questions are not concerned.28  
Under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”29  Accordingly, state taxation is merely an extension of state 
authority when not in contravention with the Constitution.30  As part of their lawmaking 
sovereignty pertaining to their respective tax codes, states enjoy the “power to provide subsidies 
to promote certain public policies.”31  The various tax incentive programs in effect today are 
manifestations of state power to provide such subsidies.32 
BLTIs and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  
 
State BLTI policy, just as any other state law, must comport with the U.S. Constitution.33   
Of pertinence to the constitutionality of state tax policy, “the principle sources of federal 
constitutional limits are the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses of Article 1, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.”34  Given the motive behind BLTI policy, 
which is to garner a competitive advantage in attracting business activity over other states, 
constitutional concerns potentially arise under the Commerce Clause.  Many analysts argue that 
the rise of BLTI competition has caused a second “war between the states.”35   These analysts have 
likened the rise of tax competition through BLTI implementation to the economic rivalry between 
 
28 Id.  
29 U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
30 See Id.  
31 Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax Incentives in the United States and the European 
Union, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 93, 94 (2008). 
32 Id.  
33 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 12, (10th ed. 2013). 
34 Id.  
35 James R. Rogers, State Tax Competition and Congressional Commerce Power: The Original Prudence of 
Concurrent Taxing Authority, 7 Regent U. L. Rev. 103, 104-05 (1996). 
states under the Articles of Confederation—a very influential factor in drafting the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution.36 
The Commerce Clause. 
The Constitution of the United States, in clause 3, section 8 of Article 1, expressly grants 
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.”37  This section, known as the Commerce Clause, provides Congress 
with the exclusive ability to regulate interstate commerce.  The incorporation of the Commerce 
Clause “was meant to quell commercial animosities among the states.”38  
Initially, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution was not meant to afford 
the Federal Government with a “congressional override” on State taxing decisions.39   Prior to the 
enactment of the Constitution (and therefore, the enforcement of the Commerce Clause), and 
during the enforcement of the Articles of Confederation, States had broad and undisturbed latitude 
in enacting whatever tax policy they deemed fit.40  At that time, however, states began to enforce 
taxing measures, such as imports and exports, against their sister states, “resulting in threatened 
trade wars and worse.”41  The free reign given to the states at the time nurtured an environment of 
“vicious economic rivalry” among the states through discriminatory tax policies.42  This unfettered 
competition among the states “weak[ened] [the] national union” to a point where its existential 
legitimacy was placed into question on numerous occasions.43  After recognizing “that economic 
rivalry between the states was a significant, if not primary, threat to union,” the drafters of the 
 
36 Id.  
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
38 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013). 
39 Rogers, supra note 35, at 124. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 125 (“From its beginning, the weak national union organized by the Articles of Confederation threatened to 
dissolve into three or four separate, even hostile, geographical powers.”). 
Constitution aimed to unify the nation by granting Congress the ability to regulate interstate 
commerce.44  Thus, Congress, under the Commerce Clause, now has expansive powers to regulate 
interstate commerce even if it interferes with state taxing sovereignty. 45 
The Dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
 Congress has not, does not, and likely will not address all aspects of regulation regarding 
interstate commerce.46  Neither the Constitution nor the Commerce Clause itself “says [anything] 
about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress.”47  The 
Commerce Clause, however, does not only provide an affirmative grant of power to Congress.48  
Implicit within the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, is the 
limitation of states to interfere with interstate commerce.49  Particularly, this “negative sweep” of 
the Commerce Clause, referred to as the Dormant Commerce Clause, places an “implicit restriction 
on the ability of states to regulate interstate commerce.”50  It is a judicially interpreted extension 
of the Commerce Clause that prohibits certain state regulation when Congress has not spoken.51  
Despite the dearth of Congressional input, the Dormant Commerce Clause also “puts it into the 
power of the Court to place limits upon state authority.”52  This “judicially enforced barrier[] to 
congressional regulation touch[es] even on essential attributes of ‘state sovereignty’ such as state 
taxing powers.”53 
 
44 Id. 
45 Rogers, supra note 35, at 105; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111(1942). 
46 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for 
Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 406 (1996). 
47 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 30, (10th ed. 2013); See Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (“the bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce 
Clause but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose.” 
48 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 854. 
49 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 231-232, 239 (1824). 
50 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013). 
51 Enrich, supra note 46, at 406. 
52 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013) (citing Felix Frankfurter, The 
Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 18-19 (Quadrangle Paperback ed. 1964).) 
53 Rogers, supra note 35, at 105. 
 The courts have established, although considered by some to be tortuous,54 a two tiered 
analytical framework in analyzing potential state law violations of the Commerce Clause when 
Congress has not directly spoken on the issue.55  Discriminatory laws motivated by “simple 
economic protectionism” are subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”56  This test applies 
when a state law “impose[s] commercial barriers or discriminate[s] against an article of commerce 
by reason of its origin or destination out of State.”57  The discriminating characteristic of such a 
state law can be found “on its face” or unveiled behind the Law’s purpose or effect.58  Such laws 
contravene the “principle that our economic unit is the Nation,”59 because they “excite [state] 
jealousies and retaliatory measures” that the Constitution was designed to prevent.60  Under the 
virtually per se rule of invalidity, a state law can only be considered valid if it can be shown “that 
the state has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”61 
If, on the other hand, a state law advances a legitimate government interest—such as to 
“safeguard the health and safety of its people”—while imposing “incidental burdens on interstate 
commerce,” the Pike Balancing test applies.62  Under the Pike Balancing test, such a state law 
“will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”63  The analysis becomes a question of degree and the validity of the 
 
54 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 936 (“The search for a bright-line test for impermissible state discrimination against 
interstate commerce is likely doomed to fail, as the tortured history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
suggests.”). 
55 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
56 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
57 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390. 
58 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997). 
59 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623. 
60 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390. 
61 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
62 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978). 
63 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
state law will “depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”64 
Analysis of state tax policies under the Dormant Commerce Clause implements these same 
standards. 
The Complete Auto Transit Case and its Progeny. 
 
Modern jurisprudence pertaining to the Dormant Commerce Clause oversight of state 
taxing sovereignty was established in the Supreme Court case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady.65  In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld, against Commerce 
Clause challenge, a Mississippi tax that applied to “the privilege of  . . . doing business” within 
Mississippi.66  In affirming the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision to uphold the Mississippi 
tax, the Court chose to focus on the practical effect of a tax measure on interstate commerce instead 
of “attaching constitutional significance to [] semantic difference[s]” based on wordplay and 
draftsmanship.67   Thus, one central theme behind the holding in Complete Auto was that analysis 
of state tax policy under the Commerce Clause “should focus on the ‘practical effect’ of the 
challenged tax measure, and not merely on its formal phrasing or technical structure.”68 
Interestingly, however, the primary significance of Complete Auto was not found in its 
holding.  In dicta, the Supreme Court established a four-part test that would later be used to 
determine when a particular state tax violates the Commerce Clause.69  This test, later referred to 
as the Complete Auto test, will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the 
 
64 Id. 
65 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 285. 
68 Enrich, supra note 46, at 425. 
69 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89 (“Accordingly, we now reject the rule of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 
O'Connor, that a state tax on the ‘privilege of doing business' is per se unconstitutional when it is applied to 
interstate commerce, and that case is overruled.”) 
“tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly 
apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the 
services provided by the state.”70  After the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 1977, the 
Complete Auto test has “emerged as the starting point for modern Commerce Clause analysis of 
state taxes.”71 
The Anti-Discrimination Prong of the Complete Auto Test. 
The Complete Auto test “applies to all forms of state tax, user fee or other law that directly 
or indirectly, partially or in total, impacts protected [interstate] commerce.”72  Arguably, the most 
applicable challenge to State BLTI policies stem from the third prong of the Complete Auto test, 
which looks to whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce.73  This anti-
discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test has been identified as “perhaps the most crucial 
element of the Commerce Clause as applied to state taxation.”74  Thus, it is likely the most 
appropriate avenue for opponents of tax incentive programs, such as the Excelsior Jobs Program, 
to issue challenges because the effects of these tax incentive programs favor local economies.75 
Essentially, under the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test, state tax 
policies, such as BLTIs, must provide “equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers 
similarly situated” when interstate commerce is implicated.76  Although the premise of the anti-
discrimination prong seems relatively straightforward, the parameters behind its enforcement has 
 
70 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 117, (10th ed. 2013) (citing 430 U.S., at 279). 
71 Id. at 131. 
72 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 857. 
73 Kaye, supra note 31, at 128. 
74 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 863 (“In contrast to the antidiscrimination requirement, which is virtually not 
qualified, the remaining restrictions on state taxation (substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fair relation to 
services provided by the state) grant the state greater leeway in designing taxing provisions. Moreover, the 
substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly related requirements are to some extent independently incorporated 
by the Due Process clause.”) 
75 Kaye, supra note 31, at 128. 
76 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 728 (1981). 
not been so clear-cut.  Throughout the years, however, relevant case law has elaborated on the 
anti-discrimination prong and has set forth two concrete standards that will be used to assess the 
constitutionality of BLTIs under the anti-discrimination prong of the Commerce Clause.  Under 
these standards, a taxing measure will violate the Complete Auto test, and accordingly the 
Commerce Clause, if it obstructs free trade or cultivates economic protectionism.  
Standard 1: Free Trade Standard.  
For purposes of this Note, the first standard enunciated under the anti-discrimination prong 
will be referred to as the Free Trade standard.77  The Free Trade standard emphasizes the 
importance in Commerce Clause jurisprudence of establishing and maintaining a “national free 
market.”78  As eloquently stated by Justice Jackson, “every farmer and every craftsman shall be 
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation 
[and] every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area of the Nation 
to protect him from exploitation.”79  In nurturing this “certainty,” the Free Trade standard 
guarantees the “‘right’ to engage in interstate trade free from restrictive state regulation.”80 
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,81 the Supreme Court of the United 
States articulated that the Free Trade standard was a potential means by which state taxes could 
violate the Commerce Clause.  There, New York amended its securities transfer tax, which reduced 
the tax burden on transfers by nonresidents and on transfers of large blocks of shares, but only if 
the transfers were made on a New York exchange.82  Several stock exchanges located outside of 
New York challenged the amended New York transfer tax as unconstitutional under the anti-
 
77 See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
78 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469-70 (1992). 
79 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
80 Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 470. 
81 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
82 Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 318. 
discrimination prong of the Commerce Clause.83  The Supreme Court held that the amended New 
York transfer tax was unconstitutional as it impermissibly discriminated against interstate 
commerce.84 
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that discriminatory treatment from the amended transfer tax 
violated the Commerce Clause because it had the effect of obstructing free trade.85  The Court 
propounded on the fact that the “fundamental purpose of the [Commerce] Clause is to assure that 
there be free trade among the several State[s].”86  Free trade was obstructed by the New York tax 
because the tax diverted the “flow of securities . . . from the most economically efficient channels” 
into New York.87  The Court cautioned that “[t]his diversion of interstate commerce and 
diminution of free competition in securities sales are wholly inconsistent with the free trade 
purpose of the Commerce Clause.”88  Thus, pursuant to the Court’s holding in Boston Stock 
Exchange, the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test will be violated when a state 
tax policy diverts economic activity from their most economically efficient channels, thereby 
obstructing free trade.89 
Standard 2: Economic Protectionism from Discriminatory Effects 
 For purposes of this Note, the other anti-discrimination prong standard enunciated by case 
law will be referred to as the Economic Protectionism standard.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has found state tax policies to violate the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto 
test when such policies proliferate protectionist or isolationist ideals between and against sister 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 330 (noting that “[t]he extra tax burden on out-of-state sales created by s 270-a is not what the New York 
Court of Appeals holds it out to be; it neither compensates for a like burden on in-state sales, nor neutralizes an 
economic advantage previously enjoyed by the appellant Exchanges because of s 270.”) 
86 Id. at 335. 
87 Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
states.90  Such policies, which are designed to mandate a “preferred right of access, [to in-state 
residents] over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within [state] borders,”91 cause 
the “multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the 
Constitution.”92   
In Maryland v. Louisiana,93 the Supreme Court elaborated on the Economic Protectionism 
standard often used in Commerce Clause cases.  There, a Louisiana “first-use” tax was challenged 
under the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test because the Louisiana first-use tax 
scheme offered tax exemptions to Louisiana consumers “but [] uniformly applie[d]” to out-of-state 
consumers, effectively burdening interstate commerce.94  The Court agreed that the  Louisiana 
first-use tax is unconstitutionally discriminatory against interstate commerce because it fostered 
economic protectionism by “providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.”95 
Essentially, the Louisianan taxing scheme violated the Commerce Clause because it favored local 
business and local activities over out-of-state activities.96  
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,97 the Supreme Court of the United States further 
elaborated on the Economic Protectionism standard.  There, the Court analyzed a Hawaii excise 
tax that was challenged, in part, as unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Commerce Clause 
because it offered tax exemptions to locally produced alcoholic beverages without offering such 
incentives to out-of-state beverages.98  The taxing scheme was defended on the grounds that the 
 
90 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982). 
91 Id.  
92 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 728 (1981). 
93 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
94 Maryland, 451 U.S. at 725. 
95 Id. at 728. 
96 Id. at 728. 
97 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
98 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265. 
exemptions did not constitute a substantial competitive threat to out-of-state alcoholic beverages,99 
and that they were meant to promote the struggling liquor enterprises within Hawaii.100 
The Court held that the Hawaii excise liquor tax was unconstitutionally discriminatory 
under the Commerce Clause because “it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor 
of local products,” therefore fostering economic protectionism.101  The Court identified the Hawaii 
excise tax as a protectionist tax because it was meant to bolster local economy by providing a 
direct commercial advantage through lower tax burdens.102  This was sufficient for the Court to 
incorporate the per se rule of invalidity and consequently invalidate the tax.103 
 Pivotal to their holding, the Supreme Court analyzed the nuance behind protectionist taxes. 
The Court first defined economic protectionism as legislation “imposed by a State operating to the 
disadvantage of the products of other States when introduced into the first mentioned State.”104  
Such legislation, the Court articulated, is “a regulation in restraint of commerce among the States, 
and as such is a usurpation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Congress of the 
United States.”105  The Court then held that state taxing legislation will “constitute[] ‘economic 
protectionism’ . . . on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, . . . or discriminatory effect.”106  
Discriminatory effect was said to be found “as long as there is some competition between the 
locally produced exempt products and non-exempt products from outside the State.”107  The Court 
 
99 Id. at 268. 
100 Id. at 272. 
101 Id. at 273. 
102 Id. at 270. 
103 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984). 
104 Id. at 271 (citing Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886).). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 270. 
107 Id. at 271. 
reiterated their stance that they “need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it 
unconstitutionally discriminates.”108 
Thus, a state tax policy will be found to violate the Economic Protectionism standard, and 
accordingly the Commerce Clause, when it “attempts to convey advantages on local merchants,” 
or “give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other States.”109 As indicated in 
Maryland and Bacchus, a commercial advantage obtained through preferential tax treatment is 
also deemed violative of the Commerce Clause, regardless of the means by which it is manifested 
or of the intent of the tax or of the magnitude of the effect.110  The Economic Protectionism 
standard refrains from assessing such factors because economic protectionism is seen as the “very 
evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.”111  Thus, in its most extreme 
application, the Economic Protectionism standard will find a state tax measure violative of the 
Commerce Clause if it has the indirect effect of favoring local businesses regardless of the certainty 
or magnitude of such effects. 
III. ANALYSIS. 
 
Although the standards enunciated by case law regarding the anti-discrimination prong 
have been applied to various tax policies, the constitutionality of BLTIs under the anti-
discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test remains largely unanswered.112  There are 
conflicting decisions regarding whether tax incentive programs survive constitutional analysis.113  
This Section of the Note will initially analyze BLTI policies under the standards enunciated under 
 
108 Id. at 269 (holding, therefore, that the “small competitive threat” from the Hawaii excise tax was sufficient to 
show protectionist effects.) 
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110 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
111 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978). 
112 Kaye, supra note 31, at 128. 
113 Tatarowicz, supra note 18, at 870. 
the case law regarding the anti-discrimination prong.  This Section will then analyze whether such 
standards sufficiently encapsulate the entire concern behind the anti-discrimination prong.  The 
bulk of this Section will argue that although the standards are indeed insufficient in determining 
whether the anti-discrimination clause has been violated, BLTIs are nonetheless unconstitutional 
given other commonly used considerations.  Lastly, this section will discuss why BLTIs have not 
already been deemed unconstitutional. 
BLTIs under the Anti-Discrimination Prong. 
 BLTI tax policies likely violate the Free Trade standard enunciated in Boston Stock 
Exchange, meaning they likely have an effect of impermissibly obstructing free trade.114  Under 
the Free Trade standard, a tax measure will be found unconstitutional when it directs economic 
activity from the most economically efficient channels.115  Arguably, BLTIs were created for this 
exact purpose.  BLTI policies were designed to attract and retain business activity through the 
implementation of tax credits and the like, aimed at reducing the tax burden of participating 
businesses.116  In a scenario where all relevant economic and business-oriented considerations 
between two states are made equal, the location decision by the business-in-question would not 
trend towards one state or the other.  In fact, each state would have an equal chance at acquiring 
the business, and its subsequent economic impact.  If one state were to employ a BLTI, however, 
the decision to locate made by the business will favor the State with the BLTI.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the economic activity is being directed away from the most economically 
efficient channels, as both States had the potential to attract the State. 
 
114 See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). 
115 Id. 
116 Enrich, supra note 46, at 382 (“Recent years, however, have seen an extraordinary expansion in the use of tax 
incentives, not to protect in-state businesses, but to influence business decisions about where to locate.”) 
However, in instances where the BLTI benefit to the business outweighs the economic 
efficiency of locating within another state, the Free Trade standard will conclusively be violated.117  
Take for instance a scenario where in which one State (State A) has a small competitive 
advantage—through its resources, workforce, etc.—that renders it the most economically efficient 
state to run a business.  For illustrative purposes, assume the efficiency benefit can be quantified 
at 100 dollars.118  Thus, all things equal, the optimal location for the business to operate is in State 
A and the business should choose this State to headquarter in.  If, however, a competing State 
(State B) implements a BLTI that reduces the tax obligation by 120 dollars, then the business will 
likely operate within State B and experience an additional twenty-dollar reduction in overall 
costs.119  In this situation, the business decision has been directed away from the most 
economically efficient channels through tax regulation imposed by State B.  Although the figures 
were arbitrarily chosen, the principle stands the same: BLTIs were made to divert location 
decisions from the most economically sensible states.120  Such a scenario violates the Free Trade 
standard, and it is exactly because of that fact that BLTIs were inherently made to nurture such an 
outcome that they cannot ever satisfy the Free Trade standard. 
Furthermore, BLTI policies likely violate the Economic Protectionism standard enunciated 
in Bacchus Imports.121  Under the Economic Protectionism standard, a taxing measure will violate 
the anti-discrimination prong if it “operat[es] to the disadvantage of the products of other States 
when introduced into the first mentioned State.”122  Unlike the Free Trade standard, however, this 
 
117 See Boston, 429 U.S. at 331 (“Thus, . . . the choice of exchange by all nonresidents and by residents engaging in 
large transactions is not made solely on the basis of nontax criteria . . . [Where] the obvious effect of the tax is to 
extend a financial advantage to sales on the New York exchanges at the expense of the regional exchanges.” 
118 Note that this figure is primarily incorporated for illustrative purposes. Actual analytical figures likely are much 
higher and are determined in greater detail by businesses looking to determine the optimal business location. 
119 Note here, too, that the BLTI figure is only used for illustrative purposes.  
120 Enrich, supra note 46, at 433. 
121 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
122 Id. at 271. 
standard does not assess the comparative economic efficiency between states.  Rather it determines 
whether a regulatory measure discriminatorily benefits “in-state economic interests by burdening 
out-of-state competitors.”123  The protectionist quality of the taxing measure can be shown through 
either discriminatory purpose or effect.124 
With regards to BLTIs, they likely exhibit both a discriminatory purpose and effect.125 
Overall, BLTIs are created to stimulate the economic activity of the enacting State by attracting 
business activity through tax reduction.126  Although this may be a noble goal, it does not escape 
the fact that states are in an unavoidable competition amongst themselves for attracting such 
businesses.127  Therefore, to suggest that the entire purpose behind BLTI implementation is to 
stimulate economic activity would be an incomplete assertion.  Rather, a more accurate depiction 
of the purpose behind BLTIs is to provide implementing States with a competitive edge over other 
States in their acquisition of businesses.  Thus, there is an inherently discriminatory purpose behind 
BLTI policy implementation. 
BLTIs also bring about discriminatory effects upon interstate commerce in two ways.  First, 
BLTIs have an effect similar to those found under legislation imposing “home-processing” 
requirements.128 Home-processing requirements are forms of legislation that require in-state 
businesses to utilize in-state processors, refiners, etc.129 Through such legislation, in-state 
processors and the like now have exclusive access to such in-state businesses, effectively depriving 
 
123 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). 
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125 Enrich, supra note 46, at 433 (“The[] intended effect [of BLTIS] is to influence business decisions about where 
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126 Id. at 432. 
127 Id. at 396 (1996) (stating that the States find themselves in a classic prisoner’s dilemma, where each State is 
forced to compete with one another). 
128 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (defining home processing requirements at 
legislation that “erect[s]an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the 
State”). 
129 Id.  
out-of-state processors from such demand.130  They have been deemed largely unconstitutional 
because they patently discriminate against out-of-state processors.131  In effect, however, BLTIs 
are not much different than home-processing requirements.  Although BLTIs do not operate in the 
field of compulsions, they have the practical effect of assisting in-state businesses at the expense 
of out-of-state businesses.  Unless a business is completely vertically integrated, it must, at some 
point, interact with other peripheral businesses to create its finished product.  Such peripheral 
businesses located in-state are given, at the very least, a geographical advantage over similar out-
of-state businesses.  This advantage—i.e., discriminatory effect—stems directly from the 
implementation of the state BLTI policy. 
BLTI policies also have the discriminatory effect of shielding in-state businesses from 
larger tax liabilities that out-of-state business are susceptible to.  This effect occurs after the 
business, enticed by the BLTI, has located within the State that implements the BLTI.  After 
locating within the State, the business effectively becomes considered an in-state entity.  As an in-
state entity, this business is now shielded from larger tax burdens that its out-of-state competitors 
face because it receives BLTI tax credits.  This lower tax burden reduces the expenses incurred by 
the business, which provides it with a direct commercial advantage made solely through regulatory 
policy.132 
Thus, under the standards set forth by case law in analyzing whether a particular tax 
measure unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce, BLTIs are likely to be 
found unconstitutional. 
 
130 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (“With respect to this stream of 
commerce, the flow control ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is 
within the limits of the town.”). 
131 E.g., Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 349 (striking down a city ordinance that required all milk sold in the city to be 
pasteurized within five miles of the city lines). 
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BLTIs v. Differential Sales Taxes. 
 
 Interestingly, under the anti-discrimination standards set forth above, certain sales taxes 
would also be found unconstitutional as well.  Sales taxes are taxes imposed by states and localities 
that apply to the final sale of goods or services.133  Differential sales taxes are sales taxes that 
incorporate a different sales tax rate than other states.  Sales tax rates within the Unites States range 
from 0.00% in States such as Alaska, Delaware, etc. to 11.5% in Puerto Rico.134  
When considering the discriminatory effect of differential sales taxes,135 particularly those 
that apply a lower sales tax rate, such taxing measures violate the two standards enunciated under 
the anti-discrimination prong.  For one, differential sales taxes potentially obstruct free trade in the 
same way as BLTIs; they are regulatory measures that divert economic activity from the most 
economically efficient channels when the lower sales tax outweighs reductions of costs through 
efficiency.136  Further, differential sales taxes violate the Economic Protectionism standard 
because they provide in-state entities with a direct commercial advantage over out-of-state 
entities.137  In-state entities enjoy lower tax expenses that they can utilize to lower prices while 
maintaining profit levels.  Therefore, under both standards, differential sales taxes seem to violate 
the Commerce Clause under the relevant case law.  This is a problematic outcome because the 
validity of sales taxes—even of differential sales taxes—is virtually unquestioned when the State 
has a sufficient nexus with the transaction, and they are considered to be well within a State’s 
 
133 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995) (“It has long been settled that a sale of 
tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local 
transaction taxable by that State.”) 
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136 See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). 
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sovereignty to impose.138  On the likely premise that differential sales taxes are constitutional, 
there must be some other consideration that may potentially validate BLTIs as well. 
Virtually Per Se Rule of Invalidity. 
 
 One potential way to validate a differential sales tax is through its examination under the 
virtually per se rule of invalidity.  The virtually per se rule of invalidity is a potential, yet extremely 
unlikely, means by which a discriminatory law can still be deemed constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.139  In order for a discriminatory law to pass constitutional muster under the 
virtually per se rule of invalidity, the law must promote a legitimate government interest and there 
must be no non-discriminatory alternatives available to reach that interest.140  This standard is an 
exceedingly difficult standard to satisfy.141  In many cases, Courts refrain in even partaking in the 
often-futile analysis altogether.142 
 BLTIs likely do not surmount the virtually per se rule of invalidity because they do not 
promote a legitimate government interest.  It cannot be said that States have a legitimate 
government interest in gaining a competitive advantage over other States in attracting business.  
Such an interest would counter our constitutional principles of free and unified trade.143  Assuming 
arguendo that States can sufficiently argue that BLTI implementation furthers the State’s 
legitimate government interest of stimulating the economy, BLTIs still do not pass constitutional 
muster.  This is the case because there exists other non-discriminatory alternatives also have the 
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effect of stimulating economic activity.  States can implement regulation that can strengthen 
workforce capabilities, further develop their infrastructure, etc.  These methods would have a 
significant effect on stimulating economic activity within the State without treating in-state and 
out-of-state entities differently.  Thus, BLTIs cannot surmount the virtually per se rule of 
invalidity. 
 Differential sales taxes, however, are subject to a different fate than BLTIs under the 
virtually per se rule of invalidity.  Although the concept of sales tax imposition easily surmounts 
this standard, the fact that States implement such taxes at varying levels presents difficult 
questions.  When analyzing sales taxes under the virtually per se rule of invalidity, states have a 
legitimate government interest in generating revenue from the sale of goods or services.  There is 
also no other means by which to generate the revenue than to impose a tax.  On the other hand, 
with regards to differential sales taxes, though a legitimate government interest may be found, 
there is no reason why the tax cannot incorporate the tax rate that avoids the discriminatory effect 
incidental to differential sales taxes.  To simplify, the non-discriminatory alternative when 
attempting to generate sales tax revenue would be to impose the same sales tax rate as everyone 
else.  However, because there is no ordinary sales tax rate—as different states impose different 
rates—imposing the “same” sales tax rate is impossible.  Thus, there are no non-discriminatory 
alternatives available in imposing a sales tax at any rate, and the virtually per se rule of invalidity 
is surmounted. 
Pike Balancing Test: Whether the Burden Outweighs the Benefits 
 
 Although differential sales taxes likely survive analysis under the anti-discrimination prong 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause under the virtually per se rule of invalidity, it is highly unlikely 
that such taxing measures would be subject to such treatment.  This is the case because differential 
sales tax only present incidental effects on interstate commerce.144  Yes, differential sales taxes 
(particularly, those below the average sales tax rate) have the effect of discriminating against 
interstate commerce, but the aim of these taxing measures cannot seriously be deemed to garner 
local competitive advantage.  On the other hand, BLTI tax policies do not have an incidental affect 
on interstate commerce.  BLTIs are deliberately designed to impact and affect interstate commerce 
directly.  Thus, although BLTIs will likely be analyzed under the virtually per se rule of invalidity, 
differential sales taxes would be scrutinized under the more lenient Pike Balancing test. 
 The Pike Balancing test applies when “legislative objectives are credibly advanced [from 
the State legislation] and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade.”145  This occurs 
when “the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental.”146  Under the Pike Balancing test, state 
legislation “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”147  The analysis of any particular legislation becomes, 
therefore, a “question . . . of degree.”148  Under such an analysis, differential sales taxes easily 
survive constitutional muster.149 
 On the other hand, even though analysis of BLTI policies under the Pike Balancing test 
would be unlikely,150 BLTIs would still fail under this standard anyway.  With regards to BLTIs, 
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150 Since BLTIs do not incidentally affect interstate commerce but are instead aimed to create such affects.  
the burden on interstate commerce would result from the inefficiency in business activity 
allocation.  The benefit to the implementing State would result from the economic stimulation 
from the business entity.  In order to properly analyze whether the burden on interstate commerce 
is outweighed by the putative local benefits of BLTI policy, a brief analysis on the economic 
impact of BLTIs is vital. 
Economic Impact of BLTIs. 
By implementing BLTI policies, States have the ability to compete against one another to 
entice businesses through regulatory tax measures—through policy that has nothing to do with the 
business-attracting resources within the particular State.  This form of competition leads to peculiar 
economic consequences.  
First, States find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma where they directly reduce taxable 
income in a race-to-the-bottom fashion.151  States compete against one another for the limited 
investment dollars of businesses within the United States.152  When states compete by 
implementing BLTIs, they effectively reduce their tax revenue by offering tax credits and the like 
to businesses.  The most competitive BLTI is the one which reduces the most taxes for businesses. 
This directly reduces tax revenue for the State.  In order to level the playing field, other States 
must offer the same—lower—tax rate.  The only means by which State competitors can garner 
more attraction is through reducing the tax burden even further.  Such a competitive scheme 
effectively diminishes tax revenue simply in order to maintain competitive footing.  States would 
also refrain from increasing the tax obligation afterwards since their competitive position would 
 
151 Enrich, supra note 46, at 468 (“In analyzing interstate bidding wars from a game theory perspective, Taylor 
focuses on the supposed direct economic costs that a state may incur if it fails to match the incentives offered by 
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152 Id.  
effectively vanish.  The only means by which the tax rate could potentially return to its initial rate 
would require a consensus of all the states.  Given this unlikely consensus,153 the competitors (i.e., 
the States) are unlikely to ever attain the previous, higher tax rate.  In the long run, all of the 
competitors are worse off. 
Second, BLTIs do not upgrade business-oriented or business-attracting infrastructure.  For 
example, BLTIs create no meaningful impact on a State’s natural resource deposits (or rather the 
State’s efficiency in acquiring such resources) or the educational levels of denizens within that 
particular State.  By offering the BLTI, the State’s hope rests upon the shoulders of the business 
entity to stimulate and catalyze the economy instead.  To secure this hope, States reduce taxable 
revenue.  
But herein lies the issue; businesses will only choose to enter into a state if the benefit from 
the reduced tax burden outweighs the combined inefficiency in conducting business in the less-
opportune location and the mandated costs of improving such infrastructure.  Otherwise, the 
business would choose to locate in the more efficient location in the first place.   
 
BLTIs under the Pike Balancing Test. 
When considering the economic impact of BLTI policies, BLTIs inherently fail the Pike 
Balancing test.  This is the case because businesses, at least those operating properly, only choose 
to accept the BLTI offer when the inefficiency of operating within the State and the cost of meeting 
BLTI requirements is outweighed by the potential tax reductions received under the BLTI 
program.  When considering the innocuous economic impact that BLTI policies have on State 
 
153 Id. at 472 (stating that such a consensus requires trust on all parties). 
economies,154 the balance under the Pike Balancing Test tilts only against their constitutionality.  
Thus, BLTIs likely fail constitutional inquiry under the Pike Balancing test. 
Why BLTIs have not been defeated already. 
Despite the apparent unconstitutionality of BLTIs, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has not spoken on the constitutionality of BLTI policies.155  After the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that such tax incentive programs violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because 
they impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.,156 
the issue of constitutionality of tax incentive programs was finally going to have its day in court.157  
However, in 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim on the procedural issue of standing.158 
Thus, the prevalence of BLTI State policies throughout the United States, despite their likely 
unconstitutionality, results from the inability to bring the issue in front of the Supreme Court.159 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, BLTIs are likely unconstitutional because they violate the anti-discrimination 
prong of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Regardless of the constitutional inquisition implemented 
(the virtually per se rule of invalidity or the Pike Balancing test) the inherent nature of BLTIs to 
garner a competitive advantage in the interstate marketplace renders them impermissibly 
discriminatory.  This renders BLTI policies patently unconstitutional no matter the circumstance. 
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